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Preface 
This study began as an effort to write a political and intellectual history of the civil 
jurisdiction of the federal courts since the Civil War. In the process of reading 
congressional debates and academic writings, I grew increasingly curious about 
what was actually going on in the federal courts and how the political and 
doctrinal debates of the time related to what litigants were actualJy doing. At 
some point in my research, prompted in part no doubt by the fact that I was then 
no longer a practicing historian but a practicing litigator, I found myself trying to 
answer the latter question rather than the ones with which I had started. 
This book is the result. It is neither a political nor an intellectual history, and it 
touches only minimally on those areas. It is not, at least directly, a study of legal 
institutions or, in its emphasis on litigation behavior, an examination of legal 
doctrines as such. Nor is it primarily a study of the United States Supreme Court, 
though in some part it inevitably became one. Finally, it is not a study of the 
desirability of maintaining or abolishing federal diversity jurisdiction. 
The principal subject, instead, is the sociolegal process of disputing, settling, 
and litigating claims. In particular, the book focuses on the litigation process 
involving disputes between individual plaintiffs and national corporations over 
contract claims for insurance benefits and tort claims for personal injuries, and its 
analysis concentrates on the three-quarters of a century from the 1870s to the 
1940s. The periodization results from the fact that litigation strategies and pat-
terns, like other social phenomena, are historically specific. The period from 
Reconstruction to the mid-twentieth century witnessed the emergence, spread, 
and decline of an identifiable combination of such strategies and patterns. 
A basic argument of the book is that the strategic uses and social significance 
• of jurisdictional and procedural rules shift over time as a result of changes in the 
characteristics of the adversarial parties, relevant legal rules and institutions, and 
prevailing social, economic, and political conditions. Thus, the book argues that 
however much certain issues may constitute "perennial" or "classic" problems of 
jurisdiction and procedure, however much they may be constantly present or 
regularly recurring as formal legal issues, their social meaning and practical im-
port may differ substantially at different times and places. The social significance 
of "technical" procedural and jurisdictional rules, in other words, is as historically 
contingent as is any other aspect of Jaw or society. 
The book examines some of the ways in which litigants and their attorneys 
attempted to use the resources available to them in order to prevail in claim 
disputes, and it explores the ways in which courts, legislatures, and the legal 
profession helped shape and in tum responded to those efforts. Its focus on 
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litigation and the tactical utility of legal doctrines means, among other things, that 
legal philosophy, legislative proposals, and arguments of social policy are rela-
tively peripheral. Conversely, existing common and statutory law, the structure of 
the judicial system, the practical problems of conducting a litigation, the relation-
ship and relative resources of the parties, and the effort to gain tactical advantage 
over the adversary are central. The book views the law not only as something that 
establishes norms, adapts to social change, and responds to internal pressures 
toward rational consistency, but also as a grab bag of tools that parties attempt to 
use if they can or when they must during private litigations that are often of the 
greatest importance to one if not both of the participants. 
Two preliminary matters should be noted. First, a word about the book's expected 
audience seems appropriate. My goal was to make the discussion accessible and 
useful to a variety of readers. In particular, I had in mind at least four different 
groups: general American historians, especially those interested in the late nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries or in the social and political role of the Supreme 
Court; specialists in legal and constitutional history; scholars from a variety of 
disciplinary and intellectual perspectives who are interested in studying the rela-
tionship between law and society or law and economics; and law professors who 
specialize in either procedural issues or the problems of the federal judicial sys-
tem. With those diverse groups in mind, I have tried both to provide sufficient 
background information to make the discussion intelligible without going into 
elaborate detail and also to highlight the issues that are central to my argument 
without exploring all of the ramifications that one or another of those groups 
might find desirable. The book seeks to bring relatively technical legal subjects 
more fully into the realm of history and society or, stated from the opposite 
viewpoint, to bring the study of historical change and contingency more deeply 
into the realm of technical legal analysis. In doing so, I hope to offer to diverse 
groups of scholars the advantages of integration and synthesis. 
Second, it seems appropriate to emphasize that this is a work of history, not of 
current legal commentary. There are , of course, numerous ways in which the 
discussion inevitably implicates contemporary debates that revolve around the 
federal courts . Examples come readily to mind. On a methodological level the 
book suggests that the social impact of procedural and jurisdictional rules changes 
over time and that to truly understand them one must persistently ask who uses 
them, how they use them, and what results they achieve with them in the litigation 
process and, even more important, in the out-of-court process of claims disputing 
and settlement. On a doctrinal level the book suggests that any effort to advance a 
historically based concept of "federalism" as an unchanging or specific normative 
standard is unsupportable. On a practical level the book illustrates how and why 
parties have so frequently struggled to gain the forum of their choice, and that fact 
points, among many other things, to the immense and unfair disadvantages that 
forum-selection clauses inserted in standard retail sales contracts often impose on 
individual consumers. Finally, in terms of the connections between legal doctrines 
and social results, the book shows that use by the courts of jurisdictional and 
procedural devices to favor or disfavor identifiable classes of litigants is anything 
but new, just as it shows that use by litigants of available pretrial procedural tactics 
to gain advantages and impose burdens on their adversaries is also a time-worn if 
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not time-honored practice. The former suggests that the goal of "trimming the 
federal caseload" does not justify any specific action but provides at most a mere 
starting point for analysis. The latter underscores the importance of studying 
jurisdictional and procedural rules not only as rational methods for allocating 
judicial business or for achieving just and efficient results at trial but also as 
tactical devices that allow parties to impose different types and degrees of risks, 
costs , fears , burdens, and uncertainties on their adversaries and thereby to pres-
sure them to accept relatively unfavorable out-of-court settlements. In spite of 
such obvious points of contemporary resonance , however, this book is no place to 
explore such issues. It is and was designed to be historical , not contemporary, 
analysis. 
It is both appropriate and deeply gratifying to thank the many individuals who 
contributed to the completion of this book. I relied heavily on a vast and illuminat-
ing secondary literature, and I am particularly in the debt of those scholars who 
have begun the extremely burdensome and often frustrating task of subjecting the 
work and caseloads of the courts to quantitative analysis. I have also profited 
greatly from the comments and criticisms of friends and colleagues who contrib-
uted immeasurably to sharpening and strengthening the final manuscript. In par-
ticular, I would like to thank Richard Bernstein, Robert G . Bone, Erwin 
Chemerinsky, William W. Fisher, III, Lawrence M. Friedman, Alon Hare! , Sneed 
Hearn, Jon Heller, Peter Charles Hoffer, David A . Hollinger, Morton J. Horwitz, 
Randolph N. Jonakait, Robert J. Kaczorowski, Alfred S. Konefsky, William P. 
LaPiana, David W. Levy, Park McGinty, Martha Minow, Eben Moglen, William 
E. Nelson , Robert C. Post, John Phillip Reid, Judith Resnik , Edward B. Samuels, 
John Henry Schlegel, Henry Steiner, G . Edward White, and William M. Wiecek. 
The members of the New York University Legal History Colloquium, numerous 
and changing over the years, deserve a special collective thanks for reading and 
commenting on two separate early drafts. I am grateful to Celis Whyte , Stephen 
Douglas, Gemma Jacobs, Kathleen Moore, and Andrew Young for their consis-
tent care and cooperation in printing innumerable drafts of the manuscript. Fi-
nally, I would like to thank my research assistants, Geri Schaeffer, Mary Jane 
Oltarzewski, Rachel Rabinowitz, and Kenneth Shuster, whose work has been 
consistently reliable and helpful in preparing the final version for publication. 
In addition to friends and scholars , a number of schools and organizations 
• have also assisted me in completing this book, and I want to express to them my 
deep appreciation. Early research efforts were supported by grants from the 
American Philosophical Society, the Social Science Research Council, the Har-
vard Law School, and the University of Missouri. The law firm where I practiced, 
Paul , Weiss, Rifkind , Wharton & Garrison, allowed me long periods of time off 
and provided much needed secretarial assistance. A fellowship from the National 
Endowment for the Humanities enabled me to complete a first draft, and another 
from the American Council of Learned Societies allowed me to see that the first 
draft really contained two separate books and to complete a draft of one of them. 
Finally, assistance from the New York University Law School, where I was a 
Golieb Fellow in 1988-89, and from New York Law School, where I began teach-
ing in 1989, allowed me to complete the book. 
My biggest thanks, of course, must go tom}'. family. My wife , Rachel Vorspan, 
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offered steady support and encouragement, and she gave the manuscript the 
invaluable benefit of her professional skills as both lawyer and historian. My in-
laws, Max and Sandy Vorspan, repeatedly furnished an exceptionally pleasant 
place to work on vacations and provided me with every possible comfort. My son, 
Dan, and my daughter, Jess, consistently showed patience and understanding 
when work called me away from them, and they continually delighted me with 
their love and companionship. 
New York 
October 1991 
E.A.P. 
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Introduction 
This is a study of what I call a social litigation system, by which I mean a coherent 
and dynamic set of patterns of claims-disputing behavior that arises from an 
identifiable combination of social and legal factors. 1 The idea assumes that histori-
cal conditions regularly lead certain types of parties to dispute a relatively limited 
number of issues against one another in certain consistent ways and that most of 
the legally-related activity in any given period can be broken down into some 
number of different behavioral patterns that are recognizably "legal" and at the 
same time markedly different.2 Social litigation systems are defined by prevailing 
historical conditions, the social characteristics of the parties, the types of issues 
that the parties are led regularly to dispute, and the special subsets of legal rules-
both substantive and procedural-that are particularly relevant and useful to their 
litigation strategies. 
The concept of a social litigation system offers a way to think about the 
complex relationships that exist at any given time between the variety of elements 
we subsume under the misleadingly simple labels of "law" and "society." It repre-
sents an attempt to bridge the gap between the broadly social and the technically 
legal, between quantitative studies of caseloads and the doctrinal analysis of cases, 
between the tumultuous and changing sources of disputes on the one hand and the 
rules and institutions available to channel formal litigations on the other. Its 
purpose is to integrate a consideration of changing social and political conditions 
with the study of technical legal issues into a synthesis that illuminates their 
complex and dynamic interactions without minimizing or losing sight of the par-
ticular significance of either. 
We commonly recognize, at least implicitly, that distinct types of litigation 
differ as much in the social conditions that shape them as they do in the legal 
issues that they present. Antitrust litigation in the federal courts is profoundly 
different from landlord- tenant litigation in the housing courts of large cities. 
Securities actions have little in common with deportation proceedings, and suits 
involving personal injuries are quite different from school desegregation cases. 
Even within such a relatively narrow category as corporate litigation, the distinc-
tively social differences that mark various types of cases may be particularly 
significant: Contract disputes, for example, contrast sharply with hostile tender 
offers. Yet in spite of the various social differences, we generally identify such 
types of litigation, as I have just done, by their legal rather than their social 
characteristics. The former may not always and for every purpose be the most 
useful way to categorize, examine, and understand them. Indeed, litigation involv-
ing a wide range of diverse substantive or procedural legal issues may in many 
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cases be far more profitably studied together as aspects of social conflict centering 
on race, class, gender, ethnicity, inequality, sexual preference, or economic compe-
tition than as compartmentalized illustrations of anything narrowly "legal." 
The concept of a social litigation system is thus not primarily legal but rather 
historical and synthetic .. It examines legal doctrines and categories but attempts to 
root them in a distinctively social-historical analysis. The focus is not doctrine as 
such but the social factors and group conflicts-and especially the available legal 
and practical opportunities for strategic maneuvering-that generate and channel 
claims disputing in general and formal litigation in particular. The concept of a 
social litigation system encourages exploration of the legal aspects of those rela-
tions and conflicts free from the power of legal categories to delimit the subject 
matter and foreordain the criteria of relevance. 
Although the focus of the book is litigation, it is not on litigation in the 
abstract or in general. It concentrates, instead, on litigation that occurred in a 
specific historical period, essentially the age of industrial America. The roughly 
three-quarters of a century from the 1870s through the 1940s constituted a period 
of rapid and massive industrialization that helped transform social and economic 
relations in the United States. The period also witnessed the emergence of large 
national corporations and their rise to positions of social and economic power. 
That complex historical development, in turn, produced an essentially new social 
type of legal dispute, one between aggrieved individuals and national corpora-
tions, and it generated literally millions of such disputes. 
This book looks at the patterns of claims disputing and litigation between 
those two unequal groups of litigants that developed around federal diversity 
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear suits between citizens of 
different states. It focuses on the problems that relatively ordinary individuals 
faced when they were forced to dispute claims against national corporations that 
were capable of invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In terms of substan-
tive law issues, it considers two types of disputes that became particularly common 
and important to ordinary Americans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries: negligence actions brought against manufacturing and railroad compa-
nies, particularly by injured employees; and contract actions brought against insur-
ance companies, generally though not exclusively by claimants under relatively 
small personal life, health, and disability policies. 3 
1Wo related facts combined to create the mainspring of this social litigation 
system as it emerged after 1870. First, the adverse parties were drastically unequal 
in the social resources they brought to their disputes, and second, their forum 
preferences tended to be conflicting. Individual plaintiffs generally wanted their 
suits tried in the courts of their states, whereas national corporations favored the 
federal courts. Those two basic social conditions provided much of the dynamism 
that created and shaped the system. Although the legal categories of negligence 
and contract determined the substantive rules that were relevant to the system, 
the persistent attempts of the companies to have their cases heard in the federal 
courts-and the resolute efforts of their adversaries to avoid that result-
determined which procedural rules would be critical. Not surprisingly, the proce-
dural rules often proved to be far more important than the substantive. ones. For 
convenience, the book refers to this social litigation system as "the system of 
corporate diversity litigation" or, more briefly, "the system." 
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Two qualifications are in order. First, the concept of a social litigation system 
implies the existence and persistence over time of relatively large scale and regular 
behavior patterns, and detailed quantitative evidence is not available to measure 
those patterns with exactitude. In spite of the difficulties, however, there is suffi-
cient evidence to identify the nature of the patterns and to chart the ways in which 
they changed. Statistical data, though spotty, establish the system's outlines with 
clarity, and congressional reports and hearings fill in much of the detail. Case 
reports reveal both the persistent reappearance of critical fact situations and the 
repeated use of specific litigation tactics and countertactics. Statements by judges, 
lawyers, litigants, and legal writers further delineate the system's scope and opera-
tion. Political evidence-though only touched on here-is confirmatory, showing 
that national corporations and their attorneys consistently defended the legal rules 
that allowed them access to the national courts , whereas populists, progressives, 
New Dealers, and plaintiffs' attorneys criticized those elements repeatedly. 
Second, it is important to emphasize that the general patterns the book identi-
fies were subject to considerable variation. Of greatest importance, each of the 
states and federal judicial districts probably presented a somewhat different pat-
tern, depending on any number of specific local factors. Economic organization, 
ethnic composition, political culture, the nature of the local bench and bar, the 
particular state substantive and procedural rules in force, and the nature of the 
federal judge or judges who sat in the local federal court could combine to create 
numerous diverse and divergent subpatterns.4 As a general matter, too , it is clear 
that the system operated most pervasively in the states of the South, Midwest, and 
West. It is equally clear that the system changed over time. It operated most 
broadly in the decades around the turn of the century, and the advantages that 
corporate defendants enjoyed in the system began to shrink after about 1910. It is 
also clear that the system developed differently in tort suits than it did in insurance 
actions. The strategic considerations and tactical opportunities in the two types of 
cases were different, and their litigation patterns accordingly diverged. Tort litiga-
tion in the system reached its most intense phase during the quarter-century from 
1885 to 1910. Insurance litigation , in contrast, was relatively staid through World 
War I but suddenly escalated in intensity during the 1920s and 1930s. In spite of 
variation and change, however, certain dominant patterns did emerge in the late 
nineteenth century and for more than half a century characterized the dynamics of 
.litigation practice in both tort and insurance actions between individuals and 
national corporations. 
In analyzing the operation of the system of corporate diversity litigation the 
book emphasizes the importance of claims disputes and settlements that occurred 
outside the formal legal process. As important as the formal processes were, they 
accounted for the resolution of only a small percentage of claims against corpora-
tions. Most of those claims, in fact, were never brought to the courts , and a 
majority of those that did become lawsuits were discontinued before final judg-
ment. Studies of injured workers, for example, show that only a small percentage, 
probably no more than 5 to 10 percent, converted their potential claims for redress 
into formal legal actions. Similarly, of the relatively small number of disputes that 
did give rise to formal actions, well over half were dismissed or discontinued 
without judgment. 
The practices involved in negotiating and settling claims outside the courts I 
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refer to as "the informal legal process." Although the adjective "informal" seems 
appropriate for fairly obvious and generally accepted reasons, it may seem less 
clear why the process should also be termed "legal." I use that characterization for 
three reasons. First, the informal process disposed of claims that were or at least 
purported to be legal claims recognized and established by the formal law. Al-
though defendants denied their validity, they nevertheless often paid to settle 
them and required formal written documents to attest to the fact that the claims 
had been extinguished according to the forms prescribed by law. Second, the 
process impinged directly on the formal law by drawing actions out of the legal 
system before the courts had found the relevant facts and applied the controlling 
law. The process was a substantial and regular supplement to the formal law, and 
the formal law recognized it obliquely and even relied on its existence and encour-
aged its use in numerous ways. 
I also use the adjective "legal" for a third reason, one meant to reflect a central 
thesis of the book. The informal process of claims disposition was in practice an 
integral and essential part of the overall system of corporate diversity litigation. 
Without gaining some understanding of the relevant informal process, we cannot 
begin to understand how the formal process actually operated or what its general 
social significance was. Because the relation of the informal to the formal process 
was so integral, it seemed appropriate to denominate it as legal. 
Many scholars, of course, have analyzed and illuminated aspects of the infor-
mal legal process, and several have referred to it with the phrase "bargaining in 
the shadow of the law. "5 I prefer the term "informal legal process" because I am 
concerned with the extent to which the claims disposition process is removed from 
the process of formal adjudication and the extent to which the relevant bargaining 
factors may be extralegal and purposely hidden from public view. The phrase 
"bargaining in the shadow of the law" might be taken to imply that rules of law 
generally shape or "influence" the outcomes of private negotiations, even though 
the parties might sometimes distort or ignore them. I believe, instead, that in 
many disputes the formal law is largely or wholly irrelevant, especially in those 
cases where parties have a prior relationship, where they are substantially un-
equal, where one of them is not represented by counsel, where social or cultural 
factors restrict the ability of one of the parties to enforce his or her legal rights, or 
where a lawsuit would impose on one of the parties disproportionate personal, 
social, or economic burdens. 6 This is not to deny that the law may have a vague 
but real influence on negotiations, does cast a "shadow," and does give "regula-
tory endowments." Nor, of course, is it to deny that in some types of negotiations 
the relevant legal rules may have a major or even controlling influence. It is 
merely to say that the nature of the influence, the shape of the shadow, and the 
size of the endowments depend in each case and in the first instance on extralegal 
factors such as the character of the disputing parties, their relative bargaining 
positions, and the social context in which their dispute occurs. 
The effort to explore the informal legal process presents particularly difficult 
evidentiary problems. The ways in which parties settled, discontinued, or simply 
abandoned their claims took place, for the most part, beyond the purview of the 
law reports and outside the pages of the public written record. Further, parties 
able to use social pressures to impose unfavorable settlements on their adversaries 
had every incentive to obscure their negotiating practices and to keep them out of 
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the public view. Thus, it is difficult to obtain evidence on out-of-court settlements 
le~ ~lone evidence that is detailed and comprehensive. The massive and obvious!; 
cntlcal role played by the informal legal process, however, requires an effort to 
id~ntify and s~udy i~s significance to the fullest extent possible. Fortunately, in 
spite of the d1fficult1es, a range of sources-docket statistics, congressional re-
ports, judicial opinions, and the testimony of individual litigants and their 
attorneys- bring the private process of negotiation and settlement into view, even !f somewhat indist!nctly. The evidence seems sufficient to establish the pervasive 
~mporta.nce of the mformal legal process and, further, to identify fairly specifically 
its role m the system of corporate diversity litigation. 
By examining the litigation and out-of-court settlement patterns that character-
ized the syste~ of corporate diversity litigation, this study attempts to cast light on 
a nu~ber of issues .. Mos~ b~oadly, it tries to explore the difficult and complex 
question of the practical s1gmficance that law and the legal system had in the Jives 
of ordinary individuals. Focusing on the relationship between the formal and 
informal legal processes, it identifies some of the powerful extralegal forces that 
shaped the ways in which parties used the legal options open to them and suggests 
that the formal law determined the results in only a relatively small percentage of 
claim disputes. 
More particularly, the book argues that the dominant patterns of litigation 
behavior and claims disposition had an adverse economic impact on individual 
litigants, and it reconsiders both the so-called subsidy thesis and the more recent 
efficiency thesis that scholars have used to explain tort law in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.7 The book argues that the legal system did confer a 
kind of. de facto subsidy on business enterprise, but it also suggests that the 
economic advantages that corporations enjoyed did not arise for the most part 
from the. for~al r~les of tort law or from the alleged social biases of the judiciary. 
Rather, 1t mamta~ns ~ha~ the advantages arose primarily from a variety of social, 
p~ocedural, and mst1tut10nal factors that allowed corporations to impose steep 
discounts on the amounts that they had to pay individual claimants to induce them 
to settle out of court.8 With respect to the efficiency thesis, the book illustrates 
some of the ways that those social, procedural, and institutional constraints com-
bi?ed to hold down th~ amount and frequency of claimants' recoveries. By identi-
fymg the extent to. which common law tort rules failed to determine the aggregate 
legal costs of accidents, the book shows that those rules failed to impose the 
"true" costs of ac~idents on ~orporate enterprise and, consequently, failed to bring 
about an economically efficient level of accident prevention. 
The book also examines the impact that changing litigation tactics had on the 
opera.tio? ~f ~he legal system itself. By identifying some of the ways that parties 
used 1unsd1~t1ona~ a~d proce~ural rules to gain great and sometimes compelling 
advantages m thetr disputes, 1t shows how the patterned use of certain litigation 
tactics repeatedly helped induce both Congress and the Supreme Court to alter 
feder~l la.w in response. The pressures of a dynamic and escalating litigation 
practice, m fact, became a major factor in forcing them to restructure various 
parts of the national judicial system. 
Further, the book questions the standard assumption that corporations used 
federal d~ve~sity jurisdiction primarily or exclusively to protect themselves against 
local prejudice and to secure the benefits of a uniform federal common law. It 
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suggests that the identification of local "prejudice" is a complex and _problematic 
matter, that prejudice against corporations may have had much le~s influence on 
the state courts than has often been assumed, and that corporations may have 
benefited from various prejudicial factors as much as they suffered from them. 
More important, the book demonstrates that, regardless of the presence or ab-
sence of any operative local prejudice, corporations gained powerful legal and 
extralegal advantages by using the federal courts. It argues in addition that the 
independent federal common law was probably less significant to corporate defen-
dants than were extralegal factors in leading them to prefer federal forums and 
that insofar as the federal common law did attract corporate litigants, it was its 
fav;rable substantive nature rather than its national uniformity that accounted for 
its appeal. 
The book also addresses the long-disputed question of whether and to what 
extent the federal judiciary favored business and corporate interests, and it quali-
fies and refines ideas about the social role of the national courts in the late 
~ineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It explores striking and previously unrec-
ognized ways in which the federal courts, and especially the Suprem~ Court, both 
assisted corporate litigants and disfavored them as well. Moreover, 1t argues that 
although the federal courts were generally favorable forums for business in~erest~, 
the reasons why they were favorable were largely independent of the social atti-
tudes and values of federal judges. The book suggests, too, that the Supreme 
Court was often relatively less favorable toward corporate enterprise than were 
many of the lower federal courts and that on critical procedural issues the Court 
often adopted rules that worked to the advantage of plaintiffs who sued national 
corporations. Those procedural rulings, it also conte_nds, were often of f~r greater 
practical importance than were the Court's substantive common law ruhngs. 
Finally, the book identifies the decades that bracketed the turn of the century 
as a pivotal period in the evolution of the federal judicial system. It highlights t_he 
tumultuous years from approximately 1892 to 1908 when the Supreme Court twice 
reversed its course in shaping the scope of federal jurisdiction. From the late 1880s 
to the early 1890s, the Court began methodically and broadly to restrict access to 
the national courts, including the access of corporate litigants who sought to 
invoke federal diversity jurisdiction. Beginning in approximately 1892, however, 
it changed course and made conscious efforts to expand corporate access to the 
federal courts. Then, after 1900 it again reversed course and suddenly began to 
limit that access. The book shows how the Court's abrupt and repeated reversals 
in dealing with ostensibly technical procedural and jurisdictional rules represented 
complex responses to changing social conditions and to the tactical battles that 
marked the system of corporate diversity litigation. It argues, too, that the second 
reversal between 1900 and 1908 effected a major reorientation in federal law that 
helped shape the national judicial system for the remainder of the twentieth 
century. 
Because this book ranges back and forth from the broadly social to the narrowly 
doctrinal over a period of some three-quarters of a century, an outline of its 
structure seems useful. In broadest terms, its story falls into two parts. The first six 
chapters examine the emergence and growth of the system of ~orporate divers_ity 
litigation from its formative period in the 1870s and 1880s to its most expansive 
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and most socially divisive phase in the two decades around the turn of the century. 
The next four chapters explore the system's third stage, its evolution and decline 
after 1910 to its disintegration in the 1940s and disappearance in the 1950s. Finally, 
Chapter 11 considers the overall significance of the system. 
More specifically, Chapter 1 discusses the legal and social background that 
gave rise to the system of corporate diversity litigation, describes the system's 
basic characteristics, and explains why it was particularly advantageous for na-
tional corporations to litigate in the federal courts . Chapters 2 and 3 look at the 
two most important general advantages the federal courts offered to corporations: 
the de facto ability to impose severe practical burdens on plaintiffs and thereby to 
pressure them to discount or drop their claims; and the availability in the national 
courts after the 1880s of a "federal common law" that was, on critical issues , 
distinctly more favorable to corporations than was the common law of many 
states. 
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on "The Battle for Forum Control," the parties' efforts 
to use available procedural tools to ensure that their disputes would be heard in 
the court that would, in their view, give them the greatest leverage possible over 
their adversaries. For the reasons discussed in the first three chapters , plaintiffs 
understandably sought to bring their suits in the state courts, and equally under-
standably, corporations sought to "remove" those suits to the local federal courts. 
These chapters analyze the two principal tactical devices that plaintiffs used to 
defeat federal jurisdiction and thereby avoid the federal courts. One was discount-
ing claims below the minimum required for federal suits, and the other was 
"joining" parties whose presence in the action would destroy the requisite "com-
plete" diversity of citizenship between the adversary parties. Chapters 4 and 5 also 
explore the ways in which corporations tried to counter those efforts and the 
economic consequences of the general systemwide struggle for forum control. In 
addition , the two chapters begin consideration of the ways in which the United 
States Supreme Court responded to the developing tactics in the system, identify-
ing the changes that occurred in the decades around the turn of the century when 
the Court first restricted , then expanded, and then again restricted the opportuni-
ties that corporations had to remove suits to the federal courts. 
Chapter 6 concludes the first half of the book by considering the role that local 
prejudice played in the system. Using two special removal statutes that dealt 
specifically with that problem, the chapter develops three arguments . First, ex-
tending the analysis in Chapter 5, it concludes that the Supreme Court's treatment 
of the right of corporations to remove was the result not of doctrine or logic but of 
the Court's efforts to deal with the intense social conflicts that arose in the system 
of corporate diversity litigation. Second, considering the claim that corporations 
preferred the federal courts because they feared "local prejudice" in the state 
courts, the chapter suggests that the danger of local prejudice has been inflated 
and that it was probably only a relatively minor threat in the state courts . Third, 
showing that the concern about local prejudice in the federal judicial system was 
itself biased and highly selective, the chapter concludes that-regardless of the 
presence or absence of local prejudice-the right to remove gave national corpora-
tions a procedural advantage that was both exceptional and unnecessary. 
Chapter 7 begins the story of the system's contraction and evolution after 
19_10. It shows how legislative reforms, the rise of a plaintiffs' personal injury bar, 
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and improvements in transportation and court administration combined to lessen 
the burdens that federal litigation imposed on plaintiffs and consequently to ame-
liorate the system's harshness. The Supreme Court contributed to the process by 
upholding most reform legislation and by moderating parts of the federal common 
law. In other areas, however, the Court extended its own lawmaking powers and 
in minor areas even expanded the scope of the system itself. 
Chapters 8 and 9 return to the battle for forum control, analyzing the ways in 
which the new social and legal conditions of the early twentieth century helped 
spur an escalation in litigation tactics on the part of both individuals and corpora-
tions. Sizable numbers of plaintiffs began to bring their suits in distant states that 
offered relatively favorable laws and the lure of larger jury verdicts, a practice 
known as "interstate forum shopping." For their part, defendants countered with 
a variety of tactics designed to ensure that plaintiffs sued near their homes. In 
addition, changes in federal law created new opportunities for insurance compa-
nies to use the federal courts, and during the 1920s and 1930s, insurance litigation 
became increasingly innovative, volatile, and complex. For the first time, federal 
equity became a major force in the system, and the Supreme Court struggled 
throughout the two decades to control the new volatility and limit the sharply 
escalating tactics. Chapters 8 and 9 also establish the breadth of the pattern of 
restriction-expansion-restriction that marked the Court's removal decisions in 
the decades around the turn of the century by identifying two additional doctrinal 
areas in which the same familiar pattern recurred. 
Chapter 10 traces the disintegration and disappearance of the system from the 
late 1930s through the 1950s. The new Roosevelt Court abolished the federal 
common law in 1938, and during the following decade the New Deal transformed 
the political orientation and image of the entire federal judiciary. In combination 
with continued improvements in transportation and court administration, those 
changes meant that by mid-century individual plaintiffs no longer had any general 
incentive to avoid the federal courts. The chapter concludes by showing how in the 
decades after 1937 Congress and the Supreme Court restricted both interstate 
forum shopping and the corporate use of federal equity. 
Finally, Chapter 11 reflects on the long history of the system of corporate 
diversity litigation. Providing an overview of the system's evolution, the chapter 
considers the concept of a social litigation system and some of the ways an under-
standing of the system helps illuminate a number of issues in American legal 
.history in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It focuses on the 
utility of the local prejudice rationale of diversity jurisdiction, the merits of the 
"efficiency" thesis, and the political orientation of the federal courts in the long 
period from Reconstruction to the New Deal. It ends by stressing the pivotal 
importance of the Court's decisions from 1905 to 1908 in shaping the social role of 
the national judiciary in the twentieth century. 
One last comment seems in order. The book gives relatively little attention to 
individual judges, litigants, and lawyers and to the influence of politics, ideas, and 
culture. I regret that lack and by no means intend to detract from the importance 
of any of those factors. I hope, in fact, to explore their significance in another 
work. The focus of this study, however, is intentionally and necessarily on the 
structure and operation of the system of corporate diversity litigation itself-its 
social and legal preconditions, its characteristic patterns of behavior, its social and 
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institutional consequences, and its rise, evolution, and disintegration over a pe-
riod of some three-quarters of a century. 
. By it~elf that story seems sufficiently complex for one book. Indeed, the story 
mvolves m one way or another a wide range of legal issues and most of the major 
events that marked American life from Reconstruction to the Cold War. And in 
spite of the emphasis on general patterns of behavior and the relative absence of 
individuals , the reader should nonetheless get some sense of the underlying hu-
man c~nftict , vitality, and creativity that continuously fed the litigation process 
and ultimately helped shape the twentieth-century American judicial system. 
